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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------------------------------
DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC. , a 
) 
) 
) 
Utah corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS, ) 
ALBERT SANONE, A 0 K LANDS, INC. , 
a Utah corporation, and JOHN DOES, ) 
1 through 8 inc 1 us i ve, 
) 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
-----------------------
CASE NO. 15462 
Plaintiff, Diversified General Corporation (DGC), brought 
this action to recover the balance of a "finder's" fee to which 
it deems itself entitled by the terms and provisions of a 
written and subsequent oral agreement with defendant, White Barn 
Golf Course, Inc. (White Barn), for having found a purchaser for 
certain real property owned and offered for sale by White Barn. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants filed a Motion for Sunnnary Judgment which was 
subsequently argued to and hear'd by the court. Summary Judgment 
was awarded in favor of defendants on the grounds that one who 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
undertakes for a fee to secure a purchaser for a property 
belonging to another comes within the purview of the Real 
Estate Broker's Statute, 7A UCA §61-2-1 et seq. (1953) h" 
-- , w lch 
precludes an action for recovery of compensation by one not 
licensed as a real estate broker or salesman. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, White Barn, seeks an order affirming the 
decision of the lower court and the Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 6, 1976, a "Finder's Agreement" (Agreement) 
was executed between DGC and White Barn, whereby DGC was given 
the right to find a buyer for White Barn's golf course and 
condominium development for a specified sales price. The agen: 
of appellant, DGC, conceded that the purpose of the Agreement 
was to give me the opportunity to find a buyer that would resu: 
in a sale (Record at 30). 
After the closing DGC agreed to the payment of its fee i: 
installments, with a downpayment of $35,000.00 (designated as 
sales commission), which downpayment was paid and received by 
DGC (Record at 3 and 30). 
However, White Barn refused to pay the balance of the fo 
and on March 28, 1977, DGC filed a complaint to recover the 
balance of $115,000.00. On June 9, 1977, the defendants moveo 
the lower court for Summary Judgment on the grounds that DGC's 
-2-
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activities in finding a buyer were those of a real estate broker 
or salesman, that DGC was not a licensed broker or salesman, and 
therefore, could not lawfully recover a finder's fee (Record at 
28-30). It was after the present lawsuit was filed that White 
Barn discovered that DGC was not a licensed real estate broker or 
agent (Record at 35). The motion was argued before the lower court 
on June 21, 1977. On August 30, 1977, the court, by memorandum 
decision (Record at 39-41) granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and summary judgment was entered in favor of defendants on 
September 26, 1977 (Record at 48). Plaintiff thereafter filed this 
appeal on October 6, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue raised by this appeal is do the real estate 
broker's statutes apply to one who acts under contract for a 
co=ission to find a buyer of real property? 
POINT I 
THE UTAH CASE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER OR SALESMAN, AND A FINDER. 
The Utah case law holds unequivocally that a finder is 
within the real estate law. The pertinent parts of the applicable 
sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which are to be 
construed herein are set forth as follows hereafter and then 
-3-
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placed in excerpt form with their applicable provisions· 
It shall be.unlawful for any person, copartnershi 
or coryoration to engage in the business, act in ~he 
capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real 
estate broker or a real estate salesman within thi 
state wit 1 ·Jut first obtaining a license under the s 
provisions of this chapter. 
7A UCA §61-2-1 (1953). 
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning of 
this chapter shall include all persons, partnershins 
associations and corporations, foreign and domesti~ ' 
who for another and for a fee, commission or other ' 
valuable consideration, or who in the expectation or 
upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, 
commission or other valuable consideration, ... 
assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or 
the negotiations or closing of any transaction which 
does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, 
leasing or renting of any real estate .... 
7A UCA §61-2-2 (1953). 
(a) No person, partnership, association, or corporation 
shall bring or maintain an action in any court of this 
state for the recovery of commission, a fee, or compen· 
sation for any act done or service rendered the doing 
or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions 1 
of this act to other than licensed real estate brokers,: 
unless such person was duly licensed hereunder as a 
real estate broker at the time of the doing of such act, 
or the rendering of such service .... 
7A UCA §61-2-18 (1953). 
IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY ... CORPORATION TO ... ACT AS 
A REAL ESTATE BROKER OR REAL ESTATE SALESMAN WITHIN nm 
STATE WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A LICENSE .... 
7A UCA §61-2-1 (1953) . 
. . . . "REAL ESTATE BROKER" ... SHALL INCLUDE ALL ... CORPO~T;i 
... WHO FOR ANOTHER AND FOR A FEE ... ASSISTS OR DIRECT .. I~ 
THE PROCURING OF PROSPECTS ... WHICH DOES OR IS CALCULATLi 
TO RESULT IN THE SALE, ... OF ANY REAL ESTATE. · · · ! 
7A UCA §61-2-2 (1953). 
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A. Andersen v. Johnson, 108, Utah 417, 160 P.2d 725 (1945), 
is not in point. It involves a case wherein one of the parties 
was a licensed real estate broker. The litigation involved the 
broker's contract with a third party to pay a fee for prospects 
brought to him for listing of real property. That case held that 
a real estate prospect referred to one interested in the purchase 
of realty. 
Counsel relies strongly on Justice Wade's dissent in that 
case wherein Justice Wade excludes from the intent and purpose of 
the statute the casual or remote influence of a stenographer or 
1 other party. The case, nevertheless, does not exclude a finder 
for the purchase of real property from the provisions of the real 
estate law of the State of Utah. 
B. Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 (1959), is 
the second case discussed by appellant's counsel. 
Counsel disregards the specific and direct holding of the 
case, to-wit: 
... Appellant contends the court erred in concluding 
that he was precluded from recovery because he had 
not obtained a real es·tate broker's license because 
(1) the real estate broker's statutes do not a 1 to 
one who merel introduces a 
nor to transactions in t e oi an gas usiness; 
and (3) because oil and gas leases are not real estate. 
We find no merit to any of these contentions. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1020. 
-5-
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That case specifically and clearly holds that there . 
1S i 
merit in the contention that the real estate proker' s statutes 
do not apply to one who merely introduces a buyer to an owner. 
Counsel makes great point of dictum by Justice Wade 
wherein it is stated in the opinion: 
.... Such an agreement contemplated more than the 
mere finding or introduction of a buyer and clearly 
was the sort of activity embraced within the 
definition of "Real estate broker" quoted above ... 
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1021. 
It is suggested that the reading of the whole decision 
forces the inescapable conclusion that the statement is simpli 
an a fortiori argument. The additional elements added to 
introducing the buyer and seller make it follow with stronger 
reason that the activity fell within the real estate broker's 
statutes. The case does not say the additional elements are 
necessary to bringing a finder's contract within the statute. 
I 
C. All fine distinctions and strained reasoning being L 
to one side, the Utah law says a corporation which "assists or 
directs in the procuring of prospects" calculated to result iti 
a sale is a broker. The appellant corporation, DGC, falls 
within the prohibitions of the statute and should not be alloi 
a fee. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH LAW STATED ABOVE IS MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN THE 
CALIFORNIA LAW. 
-6-
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Appellant's Brief relies upon the California statute and 
case law. A reading of the applicable statutes demonstrates the 
difference between Utah and California law of brokers. 
The California law referred to in Section 10131 (a) of the 
Real Estate Regulations is a definition of a real estate broker: 
(a) Sells or offers to sell, buys or offers to buy, 
solicits prospective sellers or purchasers of, solicits 
or obtains listings of, or negotiates the purchase, 
sale, or exchange of real property. 
§10131 (a) Real Estate Regulations. 
The Utah law in the Utah Code Annotated defines a 
broker differently: 
... assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or 
the negotiation or closing of any transaction which 
does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, 
leasing or renting of any real estate. 
UCA §61-2-2 (1953). 
Ttfuile the California law above stPted does refer to 
soliciting prospective sellers or purchasers, the Utah law is 
much more restrictive wherein it says "assists or directs in 
the procuring of prospects or the negotiation or closing ... " 
The reading of the two statutes indicates that the applicable 
California case law construing the California statute is not of 
value as any authority to aid this court in the construing of 
the Utah statute. The California statute and the California 
case law allow for finders and finder's fees. The Utah case 
laV1 and t . Utah statutes do not. 
-7-
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POINT III 
OTHER STATES HAVE REPUDIATED THE CALIFORNIA POSITION 
WITH RESPECT TO ALLOWING FINDERS OUTSIDE OF THE 
BROKERAGE LAWS. 
Although counsel refers to California's approach as "an 
enlightened one", that view has long since been discounted and 
disallowed in other states. As early as 1931 in the Washingto-
case of Grarmner v. Skagit Valley Lumber Co. , 162 Washington, 
677, 299 Pacific Reporter 376, the Supreme Court listened to~ 
repudiated all of the arguments proposed by counsel in this ca 
In determining if the salesman in that case was acting as a 
broker, or could avoid the consequences of the broker lb~ 
being a finder, the court held the finder-broker distinction d 
not lie and the activities covered in the case were that ofa 
broker. The court quoted the case of Baird v. Krancer, 138 
Misc. Rep. 360, 246 N.Y.S. 85, 87 and said: 
* * *"The court is constrained from the evidence in 
the case submitted by the plaintiff to arrive at the 
concrusion that this was an action for real estate 
brokerage as contemplated by section 440 of the Real 
Property Law ·k ·k *and it was clearly the intent of the 
Legislature to protect dealers in real estate from 
un-licensed persons who acted as brokers that the 
statute was enacted. To interpret the statute so as 
to permit men under the guise of an alleged in~ro­
duction to evade section 440 would simply nullify 
the statute and would expose the public by judicial 
interpretation to the very evils that the Legislature 
and the reputable brokers of the state sought to 
protect it from. o'c o'c ·k If real estate is going_ to be 
the principal element involved in the transact~on, !!. 
broker has to have a license and cannot evade ~ts . 
necessity by referring_ to the servi~es as originat 11!& 
or introducing or any other fantastic term. A 
-8-
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statute enacted for the protection of the public must 
be interpreted fairly to effect the purposes of its 
enactment. It is not to be rendered ineffectual by 
a strained construction. -
~he essentia~ feature of~ broker's employment is to 
bring the parties together in an amicable frame of mind 
with an attitude toward each other and toward the ' 
transaction in hand which permits their working out the 
terms of their a reement. The ma reach that a reement 
without his ai or inter erence. Indee , in a trans-
action of any magnitude, the terms would never be 
settled beforehand or negotiated finally by the broker. 
Each party would always wait until in direct contact with 
the other side in order that he might drive the best 
bargain possible. The broker would have no opportunity 
to induce one party or the other to agree upon some or all 
of the terms and would not be expected to do so. He would 
be entitled to his commission if the parties agreed upon 
terms originally proposed by one or the other, or agreed 
between themselves after the introduction. 
This does not mean that the broker has not negotiated 
the transaction. He does that when he builds up in the 
minds of the parties a desire to do the business. He 
never cares what the terms are, so long as the agreement 
occurs. If the statute does not apply to such a situation, 
then it is a toothless enactment. Every unlicensed broker 
will make the same argument that the plaintiff here has 
made, that he did not have to bring the parties to actual 
agreement upon all the details, that that phase was 
something for the parties themselves to determine. In 
short, every un-licensed broker will be enabled to carry 
on his business just as he did before the statute came 
into existence, simply by calling himself a finder, an 
originator, an introducer, instead of a broker. This 
would be an absurd limitation of the statute and one 
unfounded in reason or policy. A broker 'negotiates' just 
as much when he brings parties together in such frame of 
mind that they can by themselves evolve a plan of procedure, 
as when he himself carries on the discussion and personally 
induces an agreement to accept a specific provision. . . . 
(Emphasis supplied). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the case is best summarized by two quotes 
from Judge Ronald O. Hyde's Memorandum Decision. Judge Hyde 
- 9-
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quoted Andersen v. Johnson, supra: 
"The primary purpose of real estate business is to sell 
real estate or its use and from such transactions 
receive a fee or commission ... 
Judge Hyde said: 
"I hold directly that: One who undertakes, on a commis-
sion or fee basis to secure a purchaser for property 
belonging to another is within the Real Estate Broker's 
Statute and must be licensed. * * '"' Defendants' Motion 
for Surnnary Judgment is granted. 
The appellant was aware of the above facts and that is 
why it designated the $35, 000 payment received from responder 
as a "sales cmrnnission" and not a finder's fee. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 1978. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
-10-
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ROBERT V. PHILLIPS 
Attorney for Respondents 
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